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48 pages 1 hour read

Getting to Yes

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1981

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Part 3Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Part 3: “Yes, But…”

Part 3, Chapter 6 Summary: “What If They Are More Powerful? (Develop Your BATNA—Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement)”

Sometimes, the other side has all the advantages: much better weapons, more powerful negotiating staff, products that cost vastly more than you can pay. In these situations, it’s best to avoid agreements that “put an end to” the negotiation but harm you in the process (100). It’s also wise to marshal your resources so you’re in the best possible position regardless of the outcome.

Most negotiators have a “bottom line”—for example, a lowest price they’ll accept or a highest price they’re willing to pay. This prevents falling to temptation during stress, but it also locks you in place and cuts off other solutions.

A better approach is to consider the options if there is no agreement. A house seller, for example, can look at renting the property, remodeling it, tearing it down and rebuilding, and so forth. This thought process produces a “BATNA—your Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement” (102). A BATNA replaces a bottom line with a “trip wire” that raises an alarm when your best deal is worse than no deal.

Knowing your alternatives gives you the ability to walk away when you know the offered deal is worse than no deal. This negates a more powerful negotiator’s assets. A wealthy tourist visiting Mumbai wants to buy a decorative pot from a poor saleswoman, but she knows the market, can always sell the item to someone else, and, aware of the tourist’s wealth, can up the price. Thus, the tourist’s money and power do nothing for him but instead help her.

The real power lies with the side that’s more flexible. A big corporation’s factory lies just outside a small town; the factory pays few taxes and refuses to cough up any more. The town, however, has a BATNA: It can expand its borders, absorb the factory, and automatically charge it vastly more in taxes. Without its own BATNA, the powerful corporation suddenly is weak: It must cave and accept a higher tax rate.

A strong BATNA comes from lists of ideas winnowed down into several strong alternatives, from which one is chosen as the best fallback position. A worker can generate job offers in another city and compare them to the best offers in her current locale. A union may develop plans to go on strike, call in a mediator, or escalate actions based on a set of deadlines: “The better your BATNA, the greater your ability to improve the terms of any negotiated agreement” (106).

It’s also important to know the other side’s likely BATNA. If they’re overestimating their options, or underestimating yours, let them know. Either way, the stronger your BATNA, the more negotiating power you have. 

Part 3, Chapter 7 Summary: “What If They Won’t Play? (Use Negotiation Jujitsu)”

Sometimes, the other side simply refuses to look at options and focuses its talking points on its position. In this situation, two techniques may break the logjam: “negotiation jujitsu” and “one-text mediation” (109-10).

“Negotiation jujitsu” is simple. When the other side attacks verbally, refuse to respond. When they state their position, ask how it will resolve both side’s concerns and how it conforms to standard norms. When they criticize your proposal, request more details on how it fails to fulfill their interests. Seek out their advice on what they’d do in your shoes. If they attack your motives, reply that you share their concerns and want ideas from them on how both sides can meet needs. As in jujitsu, you convert the energy of their attack into constructive problem solving.

Silence, too, is powerful: It leaves a gap in the talks that the other side will feel compelled to fill. If they attack, just listen: They’ll probably say even more, which you can use as a platform for questions. Once you’ve asked them, wait silently for a response and let them do the work.

One-text mediation uses an outside party. An architect, for example, can listen to a couple’s disagreement over the house they want to build, ask each for a list of wants and reasons, sketch a plan that provides for both sides’ needs, and ask for feedback to improve the sketch. This process gets repeated multiple times as the design edges closer to both sides’ approval, a single “text” that they either both accept or reject. It helps the couple focus on a house that suits both of them instead of one to which they must concede.

Either side can initiate a one-text process. In a three-way or larger negotiation, one of the parties—the one who cares more that an agreement be reached than the details of how it’s achieved—can become the mediator. They have a vested interest in success, and they don’t need to take sides. In multi-party talks, the one-text procedure becomes vital: It prevents the chaos of several competing texts.

The one-text approach worked successfully in the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David talks, during the Law of the Sea negotiations, and with the South African pact that created a democracy and eliminated apartheid.

Several statements help keep a negotiation on a principled track. These include, “Please correct me if I’m wrong,” which introduces information diplomatically; “We appreciate what you’ve done for us,” which acknowledges any previous contributions and removes the threat of name-calling and bitterness; and, “Our concern is fairness,” which keeps talks focused on accepted standards for resolving differences (120-21).

Among other useful framing expressions are, “Let me get back to you” (126), which allows a negotiator to consult with their team; “One fair solution might be,” which suggests that the answer can be one of many ideas; and, “If we agree [or] if we disagree,” which prefaces a polite explication of what may occur after the talks end, especially things that the presenter frames as consequences outside their control (126-28).

If all goes well, the last words—which promise friendly dealings in the future—can be: “It’s been a pleasure dealing with you” (129).

Part 3, Chapter 8 Summary: “What If They Use Dirty Tricks? (Taming the Hard Bargainer)”

Sometimes negotiators resort to “tricky bargaining”—lies, threats, pressures—that serve as procedural moves meant to tip the negotiation in their favor. While it’s tempting to respond in kind or cave in, the wiser approach involves three parts: (1) Recognize the tactic; (2) call attention to it; and (3) question its legitimacy.

To avoid alienating the other side, question the tactic they use but don’t question their integrity. If, for example, they arrange the venue to put the sun in your eyes, you can react simply by pointing out that the sun is a distraction and may cause delays in the negotiation. Using the principle of fairness, suggest that the two sides trade off experiencing the distraction. If the other side persists, one option is to break off talks and tell them to call when they’re ready to deal in a mutually acceptable manner.

Tricky bargaining falls into three main types. The first is “[d]eliberate deception.” This tactic can be blunted by declaring a policy of routinely fact-checking all statements. It helps to learn early on how much authority they have to bargain, which prevents them from wearing you down by forcing you to negotiate yet again with their superiors. If they declare suddenly that the agreement must be vetted upstairs, announce that you’ll also think on it. If they can’t be trusted, argue for a signed agreement that, if violated, generates penalties.

The second tricky tactic is “[p]sychological warfare.” A team may subtly belittle the other side: They make them wait, interrupt them, don’t look them in the eye, or do other things that erode the other team’s confidence. Some negotiators stage a good-guy/bad-guy argument, then turn to the other team and ask for a concession to help resolve the dispute. Threats are popular but rarely work well, since they cause the threatened team to circle the wagons. In all cases, the strongest response is to point out the tactic and stick to a principled approach.

The third type of trick falls under “[p]ositional pressure tactics” (140). A favorite is refusing to negotiate, which is itself a power play. If so, ask the other side why they don’t want to talk, offer to communicate through third parties, and suggest that you, too, should have the right to set preconditions before talking begins. Other tricks include extreme demands at the start, escalating demands as talks continue, or locking into a position till the bitter end: These techniques, along with delaying tactics and the “my boss absolutely refuses to hear of it” gambit (143), often collapse if you ignore them, minimize them, or simply stick to your principle of yielding only to reasoned arguments.

It’s vital not to become a victim of tricky negotiating, but also not to respond in ways you’d be uncomfortable being known for. By sticking to principles and reason, a negotiator doesn’t have to knuckle under, and they don’t have to explain their behavior.

Part 3 Analysis

Part 3 deals with situations that are especially difficult. Its three chapters describe different ways that one side may try to scuttle the other’s cooperative efforts, and how to guide talks back to a more cooperative effort.

Despite one team’s best intentions, the other group may launch a threat, offer a bribe, or try to manipulate talks. These usually are attempts to get the other side to accept their positional, competitive approach to negotiating. It’s easy, at that point, to succumb to fear or anger, abandon a reasoned approach, and harden one’s position, which causes the talks to collapse into positional rivalry.

People aren’t naturally inclined to cooperate with outsiders, and, to the extent that a dispute involves strangers, animosity pushes its way into discussions. The authors understand that their techniques take some practice to master, especially when feelings run high. They suggest extensive pre-planning as a counterweight to the stresses of negotiations.

Chapter 6 introduces the concept of BATNA. A BATNA is a fallback position in case talks fail. In a simple negotiation—for example, an auction on eBay—sellers may privately set a “reserve” price below which they won’t accept an offer. This is the seller’s BATNA. More complex negotiations, between, say, corporations or national governments, will have more nuanced BATNAs.

Some BATNAs are so bad—devastating wars, resource collapses, government overthrows—that negotiators may feel compelled to make huge concessions. This is why the authors recommend upgrading one’s BATNA by finding additional resources, allies, and escapes. This reduces pressure and gives a side additional strength at the bargaining table. Developing a BATNA is similar to developing options during a negotiation: It opens up possibilities that might otherwise remain hidden.

The “one-page mediation” system suggested in Chapter 7 moves negotiations away from frozen positions and reluctant sacrifices, instead aiming talks toward a solution that serves both sides. For example, it’s as if two people want to go to the movies, but each one has a favorite film they want to see that the other person doesn’t want to watch. One of them must sacrifice their interests in favor of the other. An outsider might suggest a third film that both are interested in. This makes everyone happy, and the two moviegoers now have an activity they can enjoy together and discuss afterwards with enthusiasm.

Chapter 8’s discussion of tricky bargaining includes multiple ways to counter or head off the other side’s use of deception, threats, and other bad behavior. It’s a time when negotiators must be light on their feet and have all their tools in use.

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