Fear and Loathing On the Campaign Trail '72

Thompson is back in Miami for the 1972 Republican National Convention. As he returns to his hotel with beer in the days after the convention, he talks to the “master pimp and carmeister” (318), Bobo. When quizzed about his work, Thompson responds that he will struggle to compress “about two hundred hours of work into sixty seconds” (321). Nevertheless, he delivers his quick summation of the convention: Nixon exchanged an improved chance of winning the 1972 election for the Republicans struggling in 1976. His theory is that Nixon is invested only in himself and his ability to accumulate power. Should he win in 1972, he will not be able to run again in 1976. As such, his choice of running mate is important. Nixon has selected Spiro Agnew, thereby setting up Agnew as the presumptive nominee in 1976 (should Nixon win). The Old Guard of the Democratic Party, fearing loss of power to the left-wing George McGovern, will tacitly accept Nixon’s victory in 1972 in exchange for the opportunity to run against Agnew in 1976.

Like McGovern, Agnew is from the more radical wing of the party, and Nixon has ushered them into power, believing that their presence will give him a temporary opportunity to win a massive victory at the expense of the Republicans’ future electoral success. The Old Guard Democrats believe they will beat Agnew easily in 1976 by running someone like Ted Kennedy. This is why Thompson thinks Nixon and the Old Guard Democrats struck an implicit deal for 1972 to swing to Nixon so that the 1976 and 1980 elections can swing to the Democrats. Nixon, Thompson notes, has a “keen understanding” of such Machiavellian matters. Amid Thompson’s speculations, he occasionally mentions “that Watergate case” (331), the break-in at the offices of the Democratic Party at the Watergate hotel, which (at the time) was slowly emerging as the scandal that destroyed Nixon’s second term and caused him to resign from the presidency.

Thompson describes his experience at the convention. At one point, he got lost in the hallways and found himself swept up in a “spontaneous demonstration” (333) that was organized by the Nixon Youth workers. He took part in the demonstration, even though he was still wearing a pro-McGovern badge. When the participants ventured out onto the floor, Thompson was one of the most vocal in his aggressive shouts at the media. He also describes checking into a hotel with Tim Crouse when he was certain that Mankiewicz attacked him and ran away. He reflects on the New Hampshire primary and how its unique use of personal politics helped McGovern in the early stages of his campaign. Thompson recalls when, in the early days of the campaign, he talked informally with McGovern in a dining hall while few people were interested in him. That disarmingly frank version of McGovern seems to have completely disappeared, especially in the wake of the Eagleton debacle. Thompson dislikes Eagleton and his politics, viewing Eagleton as “a peace offering to the Old Politics gang” (350), the same establishment Democrats they just beat to the nomination. McGovern believed he needed their support to beat Nixon, while Thompson is sure that the Old Guard was more likely to support Nixon’s tacit offering than McGovern’s takeover of the Party.

Thompson suggests that the victory in the California primary was the high point of McGovern’s campaign; everything since then has been political miscalculations, infighting, and institutional resistance. Since the institutional Old Guard refused to back McGovern, they will “tacitly deliver their own supporters to a conservative Republican incumbent, instead of at least trying to rally them behind the candidate of their own party” (355). Cracks have formed in the foundation of McGovern’s presumed power base. As Thompson prepares to leave Miami, he recalls an antiwar protest during the Republican convention. He describes the “ominous sense of dignity” (362) about the Vietnam veterans protesting the war in rigid silence. The protest was eventually deescalated but left a lasting impression on Thompson. Nothing they could have done, Thompson believes, could have stopped Nixon from accepting the nomination and running to win four more years.